1
7

[–] Pawn 1 points 7 points (+8|-1) ago 

ahahahahahahahaha a mud figured out how to backdoor it. Leave it to muds to figure out how to rape something.

9
-5

0
5

[–] derram 0 points 5 points (+5|-0) ago 

https://archive.fo/C1hxg :

A “tamper-proof” currency wallet just got backdoored by a 15-year-old | Ars Technica

'The attacker could then enter those passwords into a new Ledger hardware wallet to recover the private keys the old backdoored device stores for those addresses. '

'The 24 passwords, which technically are known as recovery seed, are used in the event a hardware wallet is lost or broken. '

'The reason: "cryptographic attestation" that uses unforgeable digital signatures to ensure that only authorized code runs on the hardware wallet. '

'To sneak malicious code onto a hardware wallet, the MCU must, in theory, store the official Ledger firmware and the malicious code. '

'As a result, the Secure Element mistakenly verified the backdoored firmware as genuine. '


This has been an automated message.

0
4

[–] NotHereForPizza 0 points 4 points (+4|-0) ago 

That kid makes me feel like I have downs syndrome.

0
0

[–] TheCookieMonster 0 points 0 points (+0|-0) ago 

Saleem Rashid is also the hero in this story involving a Trezor. The guy is epic.

0
3

[–] jammybritton27 0 points 3 points (+3|-0) ago 

Well, it's tamper-proof only to adults I guess.

0
2

[–] 98034570948753409857 0 points 2 points (+2|-0) ago 

Are isn't really a barrier. Middle schoolers and elementary school kids definitely can understand coding

0
2

[–] llegendary 0 points 2 points (+2|-0) ago 

That's not the main way that this device secures your private keys. Of course you don't want to lose your nano ledger and have it get into the hands of a hacker, but the main way this device works is by not having your private keys stored on your PC.

Give me one of these any day. Still the safest way to store your crypto.

0
2

[–] foltaisaprovenshill 0 points 2 points (+2|-0) ago 

This attack doesn't even expose existing private keys, either, from what I'm reading. It would allow someone to compromise the Ledger to attack future users, but if you already set your wallet up they'd have to OVERWRITE it to do the attack, making this pretty much worthless in the real world.

And as you say, the benefit here is in people not being able to swipe your private keys remotely by compromising your PC.

0
0

[–] prairie 0 points 0 points (+0|-0) ago 

but if you already set your wallet up they'd have to OVERWRITE it to do the attack, making this pretty much worthless in the real world.

You come home to use your Ledger one day, and it seems to have been reset. "Stupid firmware, I guess I'll just have to pull out the recovery phrase." Oh damn, they just drained it.

0
2

[–] WhiteSurvivalist 0 points 2 points (+2|-0) ago 

Why is this any better than a microsd card with an encrypted zip file or something?

0
4

[–] foltaisaprovenshill 0 points 4 points (+4|-0) ago 

The real answer is that you can easily spend from it without exposing the private keys, unlike an SD card with encrypted zip. I've used both, and the difference is that if you want to make a transaction using the zip method, you have to unzip your encrypted private keys and expose them to the internet (unless you do a complicated work around for offline transactions).

With a hardware wallet, you plug it in to your PC or whatever, enter your PIN, it signs the transaction and broadcasts it, but never exposes your private keys to your PC or the internet. THAT'S why they're worth $100.

0
0

[–] llegendary 0 points 0 points (+0|-0) ago 

Because your keys are NEVER stored on your PC with the nano ledger S.

3
-2

[–] Karbuster 3 points -2 points (+1|-3) ago 

Because you paid someone $1000 for it goy

0
0

[–] prairie 0 points 0 points (+0|-0) ago 

"There is absolutely no way that an attacker could replace the firmware and make it pass attestation without knowing the Ledger private key," officials said in 2015. Earlier this year, Ledger's CTO said attestation was so foolproof that it was safe to buy his company's devices on eBay.

The stealth backdoor Rashid developed is a minuscule 300-bytes long and causes the device to generate pre-determined wallet addresses and recovery passwords known to the attacker. The attacker could then enter those passwords into a new Ledger hardware wallet to recover the private keys the old backdoored device stores for those addresses.

Using the same approach, attackers could perform a variety of other nefarious actions, including changing wallet destinations and amounts for payments so that, for instance, an intended $25 payment to an Ars Technica wallet would be changed to a $2,500 payment to a wallet belonging to the backdoor developer. The same undetectable backdoor works on the $200 Ledger Blue, which is billed as a higher-end device.

Fucking hubris. So apparently they had the unsecured chip do such unimportant tasks like generate the private key and pass along the USB requests for transactions to the secure chip. Because only the secure chip could do the actual transaction, thus no way to drain funds. Well, except generating a predetermined master key, and redirecting payments elsewhere.

0
0

[–] NguyenHue 0 points 0 points (+0|-0) ago 

Woa

load more comments ▼ (12 remaining)