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[–] 17622137? ago 

As Leibniz will later point out in his Monadology;

<82. As for minds, or rational souls [see 29]: I stand by my view, just expressed,

that basically there is the same thing in all living things and animals so that both

the soul and the animal begin only when the world begins, and never come to an

end, any more than the world does; but I maintain that there is something special

to be said about rational animals, as follows. Their little spermatic animals, to the

extent that they are no more than that, have only ordinary souls, ones that can

feel; but when the select few come, through an act of conception, to have the

nature of a human being, their feeling souls are raised to the level of reason, and

to the privileges of minds.

Is it reasonable to cast aside these privileges of the reasoning mind to better speculate on

something that is chaotic, fluid and ever-changing in its nature or shall we focus on those

privileges that are the gift of the reason of the Rational and conscious mind?

Observer as Subject; the Shifting Material Construct.

It could be said that we are all contending on a personal battleground, one of thought and reason,

one that will either define mankind as sensory animal churning him as flotsam on a ceaseless

chaotic sea of the material apparatus or something yet to be born into conscious

understanding of greater things; the birth then, so to speak, of the Observer or he

who is triumphant, Transcendent Man. Do we choose to entertain

the simulation aspect of mind-body theory and apply ourselves diligently to coherence with that

which remains steadfast within this tempest of the material realm? For if consciousness is not an

aspect of the shifting material nature of the universe what can be said of the sensual experience

or of their merits?

If John Locke’s argument within the realm of Empiricist thought of mankind as a tabula

rasa was correct there would the merit of infinite variety within man’s sensual experience.

Perhaps, with this infinite variety, we would never have been capable of thinking consistently

enough to develop such things as language, for all mankind would be drowning in a vast and

heavy sea of variety and sensual experiences without any coherence other than a prison of his

own solipsism or internal reflection.