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[–] 18007821? ago 

That's my point. The math results in hundreds of thousands if not millions of dollars wasted on surveillance of potential sites that likely don't result in even encounters let alone arrests. What does it cost an anon to go for a walk? Nothing. A few hours on their day off chatting with people. What does that anon risk? Nothing more than usual considering he's already on this site. The numbers are on the anon side.

Today is a walk day according to OP. I'm already wearing my white shirt. I'll post again if I'm not drone-struck from the sky or v&.

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[–] 18007829? ago 

see

>>13115272

LOL

No faggot, you won't get drone-striked AND you won't meet anyone. But your local DHS office probably has your identity now.

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[–] 18007833? ago 

Centralize them in a single physical location with the likelihood of criminal activity real or staged (like Charlottesville)

Collect their information online by convincing anons to expose themselves with traceable data to incriminating sources (non-secure emails, website links, discords, etc)

Dissuade them from action before it begins using a single forum where all potential problems might meet

In order for the authorities to make examples of wrongthinkers, they need an acceptable context to punish them with. The first method provides all of that, to get anons to participate in a single area where they can concentrate their resources and either instigate or simply wait for illegal and/or immoral action to occur. Once it does it can implicate anyone they want there, and allow them to arrest and dox and punish those people with ease. Everyone got to observe that in action at Charlottesville, and shows very clearly why the idea of marching around without careful regulation and power just puts people at the mercy of malicious actors.

The second is a less effective dragnet, but is the basis of your classic sting or honeypot. If the malicious actor can get an anon to compromise themselves by linking their online activities which can potentially be used against them to their IRL identity, particularly in a place where sufficiently illegal activities are being proposed or encouraged, then they can be tagged, observed, and cross-referenced with ease. This is why as a rule no anon should ever visit a discord or communicate with an email that appears on the board without taking major steps to keep the link between their identity and their online activities separate.

If anons cannot be enticed to the first two methods, then the only course of action left is to prevent any problem activities from happening in the first place by convincing them not to do it. It costs time, effort, and money to build cases against people, and it is simply cheaper to prevent than to punish. Instead of spending millions on an expensive and diluted sting operation whose complexity would dwarf even the normal prostitution and drug stings everyone knows about, they can simply hire a handful of actors to pollute any discussion of an action path they wouldn't be able to effectively deal with. For a bit of minimum wage they can prevent millions of dollars in effort, but only so long as they can convince anons to not do whatever that idea is. Turns out this is the easiest path to take since jumping IP's, using TOR, deploying bots, or even just convincing useful idiots to do it all for free is extremely cheap and hard to detect.

Knowing all this, the reason why a Walk is not useful for a honeypot is because it neither centralizes anons in context-rich environments nor easily links their specific online activities to their specific IRL identities. It is not an activity that a Fed would wish to encourage without specific modifications because it's simply too messy. Instead it would be most effective to just prevent problems in the first place by bombarding the bottleneck with bullshit until anons gave up before they even began and tug on every lever of persuasion (fear, disgust, social proof, etc) to accomplish this end. And that seems to be exactly what is happening in these threads.

The positive side of all this is that because the shill activity is so high, it means the activity is particularly irritating and difficult to deal with to whomever is directing the shills. That should be encouraging in itself. The other side of it is that in a game of attrition which this activity is, the honest anons have the advantage because successes are often not reported and creates a lurking fear in the minds of those trying to stop it. They cannot tell if their efforts are working or not, and will not be able to stop what networking results from these meetings. It is to inflict a terrible paranoia on these people to think that around every park, around every corner, from every person wearing white or a hat, there might be a secret connection being made thousands of times every week that they cannot stop. And that helpless paranoia will manifest itself in these threads in desperate forms.

Enjoy it, and keep Walking.